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But limited investigation was done into the full methods used and the extent that LGBTQ groups were being targeted. Since, it has emerged that these apps are routinely used both by authorities and non-state actors to target members of the LGBTQ community. Despite technological revolution, the situation is not so different now: Following our research, we can see that the reality of how the apps were used was far more complex than geolocation tracking.

Local groups had been aware of this for a long time, but their calls for action had not been taken seriously enough.

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Patterns of arrests and targeting ranged from entrapments — use of fake profiles on social media and dating apps — where an official poses as a user interested in a relationship to build a case against the user — to street checkpoint checks of mobile devices by police and infiltration of groups chats run by LGBTQ groups. Read more about our research methodology and responses from users in our summary report. This targeting of LGBTQ groups in the Middle East and North Africa reached a climax in September when more than 70 people were arrested based on their gender and sexual identities in Egypt after the rainbow flag was flown during a concert.

Fear and real risk has driven communities to communicate and socialise online, and more recently on dating apps, where they have created vibrant and resilient hubs of connection. The apps and platforms being used can put users in real physical danger. But when the question of love, communication and connection come into play, human resilience shows; the drive for sex, love, intimacy, and association is stronger than the fear of the risks. Great risks are run through the use of apps — risks which users acknowledge. Here the responsibility of the app developers and providers becomes fundamental.

Proactive protection, security and safety measures are owed to their users. Our findings showed that up until now the burden has predominantly rested on users to protect themselves against the threats they face when using these apps. They did not see app companies as actors that would support them. However, understanding the environments and experiences of their users should not be optional for companies and apps. Sending security messages, the go-to effort towards due diligence for some LGBTQ apps, is simply not enough.

Has enough been done to secure the safety of users in the Middle East and North Africa since? We began working with local LGBTQ groups and experts in Egypt, Lebanon and Iran to gather information from users about the issues they experience on the apps. Preconceptions about the issues varied widely, and only local experts and the users themselves understood the realities. We felt it was vital to take these experiences and knowledge to companies and international experts. In fact it was this local data and personal testimonies that proved critical as a catalyst for dialogue and agreements with international experts and apps companies.

These voices can be powerful agents for change. They must be amplified. We found that many dating and messaging apps used by LGBTQ people in the region lack fundamental security features and knowledge of the contexts they are operating in. For example best practices around TSL and SSL for mobile applications, secure geolocation markers were lacking and registration and verification processes were weak. These were not the dominant reasons for the arrests and targeting of the users, but added to the vulnerability of users when they placed their trust in apps.

These risks were not lost on the users, who are not just aware of the risks they face from the authorities and other homophobic non-state actors but also the risks they faced from app security flaws. We gathered over responses to our questionnaire in Egypt, Lebanon and Iran, organized and helped the formation of focus groups lead by local organisations, and interviewed in-country queer activists in Middle Eastern and North African communities in Egypt, Lebanon and Iran to get a better understanding of issues ranging from what apps are being used, what their perceptions of apps and security are and experiences of harassment, entrapment and arrests.

Following our research, we have brought together a coalition of local groups, activists, human rights experts, business and technologists to discuss how to combat the threats we have identified to LGBTQ individuals. How can an app help a user being stopped at a checkpoint by concealing their use of a queer app? Janet Street-Porter. John Rentoul. Chuka Ummuna. Shappi Khorsandi. Gina Miller. Our view. Sign the petition. Spread the word.

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UK Edition. US Edition. Log in using your social network account. Please enter a valid password. Keep me logged in. Try Independent Minds free for 1 month See the options. Egyptian authorities are allegedly using social media and mobile phone apps to hunt gay people Getty. You can form your own view. Subscribe now. Shape Created with Sketch. In pictures: Muslim Brotherhood clash with police in January Show all A supporter of the Egyptian government flashes the sign for victory during clashes with Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

A girl looks on as around her thousands wave Egypt's national flag in Tahrir Square. Egyptians who oppose both the government and the Muslim brotherhood gather to protest outside the journalists' syndicate in downtown Cairo. Supporters of Egypt's army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi hold his posters in Tahrir square in Cairo, on the third anniversary of Egypt's uprising. A supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi shouts slogans against the military and interior ministry, while gesturing with four fingers, during a protest in front of riot police outside a police academy, on the outskirts of Cairo.

Supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi block a street during clashes with Egyptian security forces in Nasr City, Cairo. A cat stands near a defaced presidential campaign poster of ousted President Mohammed Morsi in Cairo. An Egyptian court adjourned the murder trial of deposed president Morsi to 1 February, citing 'weather conditions' that prevented the Islamist's transport to court from prison.